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Editorial
Introduction: Social
Movements in Cambodia
The last half decade has been a political rollercoaster in Cambodia leaving no aspects of
social and political life unaffected. Since 2017, Cambodia is undergoing hardening
authoritarianism led by incumbent Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which, in power in
different guises ever since 1979, since 2018 is the only party represented in the National
Assembly. In political science analysis, Cambodia might only have crossed a thin,
almost cosmetic line from electoral to hegemonic authoritarianism (Morgenbesser,
2019), but the case of Cambodia makes clear just how significant that distinction
nonetheless is. Now that Cambodia has embarked on an openly authoritarian path, the
regime is gradually changing its identity. While a multi-party formula is maintained in
form, the very notion of politics is changing from an emphasis on contestation to one on
consensus. Freedom of association and expression is severely restricted by repression of
social movements and the intimidation of land right activists by the state (Schoenberger
and Beban, 2018). Moreover, in line with developments in nearby Singapore, Malaysia,
and Philippines, and perhaps the region as a whole (Rodan, 2018), expanding political
participation through state-sponsored avenues serves to constrain contestation. Not only
is there an increased stress on civil society partnership with the government, but new
forms of mass mobilisation are emerging under the direction of the CPP, prompting
independent social actors to seek new forms of engagement with the state.
The political fracas which crystallised into hardening authoritarianism began in 2013,
when the political opposition significantly challenged the CPP in elections. This merely
brought to the surface what had long been a highly questioned relationship between the
state and its citizens: questions that had been teeming for decades framed and reframed
by social movements and land activists. The emergence of a strong opposition force had
the effect of popularising and mainstreaming an alternative narrative of citizenship with
nationwide reach and widespread legitimacy (Nore´n-Nilsson, 2016). It is safe to say that
the current repressive climate does violence to a politically and socially awakened
electorate. The effect is difficult to estimate. Cambodia’s young demographic profile, in
which almost two-thirds of the population are under thirty years of age (UNDP, 2018), is
a key factor shaping state-society relations (Eng and Hughes, 2017). It is, however in
itself no guarantee for social and political renewal, particularly since the young gener-
ation is a particular target of government efforts for mobilisation and recruitment.
The purpose of this collection of articles is to pause to take stock of the role of
contemporary social movements in negotiating change in relations between the state and
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its citizens, now that we are venturing into a new authoritarian context. Three of four
case studies are focused on land conflicts with their own distinct and complex chron-
ologies, stretching back in some cases to the early 2000s. However, the fieldwork the
analysis builds on has been concentrated over the last few years.
Access to and control over land are prevailing concerns for a significant section of the
rural and urban population (Biddulph and Williams, 2017; Hirsch and Scurrah, 2015).
Land conflicts and evictions are estimated to have affected no fewer than 770,000 people
during the period 2000–2013 (ADHOC, 2014). In 2015, the NGO Forum on Cambodia
(2015) reported that 77 per cent of the 352 land disputes which erupted between 1990
and 2014 remained unresolved. Land tenure security for the majority of small farmers
and constructive collaboration between the government and civil society remain two
faraway references (ADHOC, 2015; Landau, 2008).
The different land dispute resolution mechanisms are largely ineffective, notor-
iously known to be politically biased and usually unaffordable for smallholder
famers, and negotiation between equal parties is not on the government agenda. In
this context, land security and the promotion of grass-roots dialogue represent
nothing but a long-term societal project, at best an ideal that the majority of the
Cambodians hardly imagine as concretely feasible (Un and So, 2011). The lack of
land security for the peasants and other smallholders (Neef et al., 2013) continues to
create a deep sense of uncertainty among a silenced population (Ou and Kim, 2013).
Moreover, many investments have been accused of causing social conflict and
injustice, negatively impacting natural resources and environment (Schoenberger,
2017), and causing landlessness and other socio-economic issues (Milne and
Mahanty, 2015; Young, 2016a, 2016b). Here and there, however, groups and net-
works of people raise their voices to challenge the imposed socio-economic order
(Bourdier, 2016; Young, 2016c). Various social movements by affected grass-roots
communities have emerged in response, sometimes supported by local and inter-
national NGOs.
Another theme that is pursued below is the questioning of the very forms that social
and political mobilisation should take, which has arguably been central to citizenship
negotiations in Cambodia over the past few years. Following 2013, political infighting
between the two main political parties gave rise to a reaction against elite politics and the
birth of an agenda to promote grass-roots leadership. This re-evaluation of the role of
grass-roots has led some activists to seek to erase the boundaries between the arenas
of civil society and electoral politics. We therefore posit that a proper understanding of
Cambodian citizenship negotiations today necessitates examining the most recent period
in terms of shifting notions of the respective roles of grass-roots activists, formal civil
society organisations, and political parties.
The Articles
This special issue gathers a set of deeply empirically informed case studies so as to take
stock of the political functions and roles of social movements in today’s Cambodia.
Three of four case studies analyse the winding trajectories followed by various chains of
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actors claiming rights to land. The four case studies portray heterogeneous situations:
some movements are purely grass-roots oriented, others are associated with transnational
networks, while others still lobby financial corporations. The articles inquire into the
multiple reasons motivating these actors to be politically engaged and the consequences
of their choices. They also seek to shed light on the multifaceted factors associated with
shifting outcomes of their initial engagement.
In their article, Jean-Christophe Diepart, Ngin Chanrith, and Il Oeur seek to elicit
agency among Cambodian farmers who struggling against economic state land con-
cessions negotiate with state authorities and market actors. They conceptualise state land
management as a “dynamic process that combines a calculus by authorities to retain
social legitimacy and reproduce their sovereign power in respect of land.” Consequently,
conflicts over state land signify nothing short of a rupture between the state and land
rights-claiming farmers. The authors compare three cases of struggles in northern
Cambodia when state land cultivated by smallholder farmers was encroached upon, in
which the employment of different resolution mechanisms and varying relationships
between stakeholders have yielded different outcomes. In Oddar Meanchey, the col-
lective and coordinated strategy of NGOs, in tandem with advocacy campaigns targeting
international influencers, led to the sugar companies withdrawing and the cancellation of
their concession contracts; yet, it is unclear what will become of the land. In Taing Mlou,
Ratanakiri, Jarai villagers safeguarded their village from the incursions of a mining
company by categorically declining to engage with the company and local authorities. In
Khseum, Kratie, villagers mobilised authorities at multiple levels, the political elite, and
NGOs. Here, tensions were exacerbated by the failure to speak with one voice and the
issue remains partly unresolved. The authors find that conflict management occurs
through hybrid institutions, as the conflict transformation processes produce “contingent
rules” that are the specific outcomes of negotiations between actors. Despite the overall
shrinking space of contestation, they find that these “contingent rules” provide oppor-
tunities for resistance and negotiation with the possibility for smallholder farmers to
successfully protect their land resources.
Sokphea Young explores the role of protest movements of grass-roots communities
and NGOs in influencing environmental governance from the viewpoint of environ-
mental accountability. Worldwide, the absence of clear mechanisms for identifying
whom government and corporations are accountable to with regard to environmental
governance is considered to be a factor contributing to environmental deterioration.
Young explores the ways in which Cambodian protest movements seek to hold gov-
ernment and foreign corporations accountable for environmental degradation, by a close
analysis of two case studies which have generated persistent protests over time – against
both the government and the corporations. These are a joint movement against sugar
industry, which has been going on for more than a decade, and protests against the Stung
Cheay Areng dam project, starting in 2014. The joint movement against sugar industry in
the three provinces of Koh Kong, Kampong Speu, and Oddar Meanchey aims to directly
influence corporations, though government intervention remains necessary to ensure this
end goal. Here, the sugarcane corporations as well as the government have adjusted their
behaviour, although they cannot be said to be truly accountable to the grass-roots
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communities and NGOs. In Stung Cheay Areng valley, the advocacy of grass-roots
communities strongly supported by NGOs has targeted the government, putting pres-
sure on it to abandon the plan for hydropower development. Although the future of the
area remains uncertain, the proposed dam has so far been adjourned. This leads Young to
conclude that Cambodian protest movements of affected communities and NGOs are
influential in requiring environmental accountability from both government and
corporations.
Fre´de´ric Bourdier turns to analyse what happens when villagers lobby not only the
state, nor companies directly – but an international financial institution. Bourdier takes
his case study from northeastern Ratanakiri province, where Vietnamese private com-
pany HAGL was granted a vast economic land concession in a territory home to several
ethnic groups. Some of the funding for this company came from the World Bank through
its private sector agency, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Starting in 2009,
the discovery by villagers in fourteen rural settlements of the company’s intrusion
provoked a prompt response, what Bourdier calls the “birth of an independent social
movement.” By 2013, international and national NGOs then swayed the villagers to
adopt an alternative approach: calling for international mediation by IFC watchdog the
Compliance Advisory Ombudsman (CAO). CAO was to facilitate a neutral mediation so
as to reach an agreement between the parties. Yet Bourdier finds that the technical and
apolitical institutionalised mediation has been to the disadvantage of villagers, attribu-
table primarily to an evident power imbalance between 6,000 villagers supported by five
NGOs on the one hand, and a Vietnamese private conglomerate backed by an arsenal of
communication specialists, managers, technical consultants, jurists, high-ranking
Cambodian officers, private banks, and intermediary funds, on the other. At the time
of writing, the outcome of mediation had “metastized into a deceptive, ‘wait-and-see’,
technically biased mediation, leaving the villagers misled, confused and disorganized.”
The costly and time-consuming mediation process (early 2014 to end 2018) has also
contributed to damaging local socio-political organisation, amplifying socio-economic
inequalities, and increasing tensions and human conflicts in quite a few villages.
Shifting the analytical focus to the nexus between grass-roots mobilisation and
electoral politics, Astrid Nore´n-Nilsson examines the figure of Kem Ley, a political
commentator and grass-roots organiser, and a civil society-propelled grass-roots
democracy movement he helped breathe life into. The central question she pursues is
what notions of citizenship and political leadership associated with Kem Ley and the
grass-roots democracy movement surfaced during Cambodia’s brief democratic
momentum from 2013 to 2017 – and why not more came out of these. The 2016 murder
of Kem Ley turned him into a nationally beloved icon of democracy, but in local and
national elections the two subsequent years, the political party he co-founded failed to
appeal to the electorate. This paradox is explored from the point of view of citizenship
and the status of political parties and individual leaders. It is argued that the
Cambodian grass-roots democracy movement came about in response to a legiti-
macy crisis among traditional political parties, which prompted civil society vet-
erans to venture into the arena of electoral politics. The resulting grass-roots
democracy movement set out to systematically gather civil society leaders in a
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political party, which would operate according to civil society logics. Yet, this has
failed to convince voters, who, it is argued, though they may be attracted to Kem
Ley’s model of citizenship, have not been swayed by the resulting apolitical party.
Cambodian grass-roots activists seeking to further democracy by engaging in
electoral politics thus play a different role, making more modest democratic con-
tributions, compared to other countries in the region. Unlike in Malaysia, they stake
a “neutral” middle path rather than an oppositional one, and unlike in Indonesia,
they do so while engaging in electoral politics with a sitting electoral authoritarian
regime. The party’s democratic impact in the new authoritarian context will there-
fore depend on its utility to the ruling CPP.
This collection of articles thus probes into the roles, and the limits, of current social
movements, shedding light on their diverse functions and outcomes. Diepart, Ngin, and
Oeur suggest that despite the overall shrinking space of contestation in Cambodia, there
are still opportunities for resistance and negotiation with the possibility for smallholder
farmers to successfully protect their land resources. While comparison between their
three case studies is complicated by the fact that they differ from each other in involving
different ethnic groups, in the villages having different levels of in-migration affecting
social cohesion, and in involving investment companies from different countries in the
Mekong region, it nonetheless reveals that opportunities for negotiation can be created.
The authors propose that land conflict management takes place through institutional
pluralism in cases in which a political opportunity structure has opened, and the affected
community organises collective action and receives support from their social networks.
The involved actors mobilise hard law, statutory, and customary norms, including
patronage networks and perceptions of justice, when working their way around
“contingent rules.” Land transformation processes are consequently marked by non-
linearity and complexity. Similarly, Sokphea Young finds that while it is unlikely that
the government will acknowledge adverse consequences of their policy decisions in
the current authoritarian context, the government can still be held accountable by
pressure to correct policy implementation. The protest movements of grass-roots
communities and NGOs he focuses on have been increasingly influential in holding
government and corporations accountable for environmental impact. In Stung Chay
Areng, it has held the government accountable by leveraging environmental
accountability as a national interest. The joint movement against sugar industry has put
pressure on the government and corporations by targeting individual corporations
directly through an international supply chain approach, influencing the government to
intervene.
By contrast, Fre´de´ric Bourdier’s study of grass-roots communities employing
established conflict resolution mechanisms to lobby the IFC suggests that this strategy is
disempowering villagers. The mediation process made villagers less operational insofar
they were constantly advised to take conciliatory positions. The proposed peaceful
solution now shows its real effect which, according to the author, is “nothing more than a
sticking plaster over a major wound.” In his analysis, there is a clear divide between the
role of grass-roots organising themselves as an independent social movement and that of
NGOs, which are complicit in the demise of that social movement. But were there any
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other realistic options? NGOs, navigating the great difficulties they face in the current
political climate in which they are suspected of oppositional tendencies, seek to steer
clear of open confrontation with power holders and their allies. The unintended con-
sequence has been to annihilate popular political anger and depoliticise resistance.
Moreover, this very particular case illustrates, according to the author, the ways in which
some NGOs perpetuate the logic of colonialism by attempting to tell people what to do,
rather than letting the people themselves guide their objectives. And indigenous people
have eventually accepted, probably more by constraint than by choice, to follow the
objectives of their advocates. The logic of domination continues to be perpetuated in
spite of a sociopolitical reconfiguration of the actors involved in the resolution of this
massive land conflict. Not really a matter of surprise: one of the main efforts of the
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has been to demonstrate that domination, either by
the state or by another influential entity, never works so well as when it receives a kind of
implicit complicity of the dominated (Bourdieu, 2000, 2001).
From the vantage point of the intersection between civil society and electoral politics,
Astrid Nore´n-Nilsson’s study shines light on the possibilities and limitations pertaining
to each arena. In her analysis, the grass-roots democracy agenda brings into view the
possibilities to cross-navigate between formal politics and civil society activity available
to activists in Cambodia as various modes of participation. She argues that political
parties, marred by a legitimacy crisis, play an uneasy role for channelling today’s
political energies in Cambodia – prompting civil society activists to seek to reshape
citizenship by promoting grass-roots leadership. Yet more telling still, the fact that this
agenda has been pushed primarily through a political party nonetheless points back to the
limitations inherent to civil society work and the perceived primacy of electoral politics
for real impact.
Astrid Nore´n-Nilsson
Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies,
Lund University, Sweden
Fre´de´ric Bourdier
UMR 201 De´veloppement et Socie´te´s (DEVSOC),
University of Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne, Paris, France
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